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Louisiana's Law of Trusts 25 Years After Adoption of
the Trust Code
Edward F. Martin*

The trust originated in England hundreds of years ago and developed
over the certuries into a sophisticated instrument for the management
and transmission of family wealth.' In the forty-nine states whose laws
derive from England, the trust is a welcome old friend. Louisiana is
the one state whose laws of property and inheritance are rooted in a
different legal tradition-the civil law existing at the turn of the Nineteenth Century in France and Spain. 2 The Louisiana legislature and
courts long considered trusts alien and unwelcome; the Louisiana Civil
Code did not expressly authorize trusts, and aspects of the trust were
philosophically irreconcilable with the Civil Code. In the twentieth century, as the benefits of trusts have become widely appreciated, the
Louisiana legislature has reluctantly given the trust a place in its laws
of property and inheritance, but the trust provided for under Louisiana
law is not the same as the trust in the other states.
Louisiana's current law of private trusts is contained in the Louisiana
Trust Code, enacted in 1964 and revised somewhat since then. On the
occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Trust Code it is appropriate to compare and contrast the Louisiana Trust Code to the trust
laws of the other states.
An excellent article previously published in this journal has outlined
the history of the trust concept in Louisiana.3 While this article will
cover some of the same ground, its emphasis will be on particular types
of beneficial provisions allowed in private trust arrangements, rather
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Partner, Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, New Orleans,
Louisiana. Reporter since 1986 for the Trust Advisory Committee of the Louisiana State
Law Institute. This article and the opinions expressed in it are the author's alone. The
author's views are not necessarily shared by the other members of the Trust Advisory
Committee or the Council of the Law Institute.
1. See A. Scott, The Law of Trusts § 1.1 f.f. (3d ed. 1967).
2. See Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Actual Sources and Present
Relevance, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 4 (1971); J. Dainow, 1972 Compiled Edition of the Civil
Codes of Louisiana (1973).
3. Lorio, Louisiana Trusts: The Experience of a Civil Law Jurisdiction With the
Trust, 42 La. L. Rev. 1721 (1982). See also LeVan, Louisiana Counterparts to Legal and
Equitable Title, 41 La. L. Rev. 1177 (1981).
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than on the trust per se, and will emphasize opportunities created by
4
the legislature's amendments to the Trust Code in 1988 and 1989.
FEATURES OF THE AMERICAN TRUST

The trust laws of the other forty-nine states are fairly uniform but
have diverged somewhat from the English law of trusts.' The following
is a list of the features of the American trust recognized in the fortynine states other than Louisiana.
Dual Ownership
The essential feature of a trust is the duality of ownership between
a trustee, who holds legal title to the property in trust, and the beneficiary, who, as the "equitable" owner, is entitled to all the economic
benefits from the property in trust. The trustee is the owner of the
property with respect to third persons, yet must deliver all the benefits
of ownership to the beneficiaries. If a trustee takes an action that
damages a beneficiary, normally the beneficiary's only remedy is against
the trustee, not against the property or a third person who acquired
the property.

6

Creating the Trust
A trust is created by a "settlor." Formal requirements are minimal.
Generally, a trust must be in writing and signed by the settlor. A trust
of movables, however, may be oral. A trust can even arise unintentionally-when A receives title to property that should belong to B,
certain duties, which are identical to a trustee's duties, may be imposed
7
upon A under what is called a "constructive trust."
Identifying the Beneficiaries
A trust can have more than one income beneficiary, and these income
beneficiaries may be simultaneous or successive. Although at least one
beneficiary must be designated and in being when the trust is created,
the beneficiaries of a trust can include persons not in being when the
trust is created.'

4. This article will not dwell on the trustee's management powers, or on charitable
or business trusts.
5. G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 7 (2d ed. 1984); see also Scott,
supra note 1,at § 337.
6. Bogert, supra note 5, at §§ 1, 183, 861; Scott, supra note 1, at §§ 2.3, 199.
7. Bogert, supra note 5, at §§ 45, 81, 471; 76 Am. Jur. 2d, Trusts § 41 (1975).
8. Scott, supra note 1, at §9 112.1, 113; 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts §§ 135, 138 (1975).
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American trust instruments use a variety of techniques to determine
who will be the ultimate recipients of trust corpus. Upon creation of
the trust, a person entitled to trust corpus (a "principal beneficiary")
may be (1) vested, (2) identified but not vested, or (3) unidentified. 9 A
principal beneficiary is "vested" if any distribution of corpus will either
be made to him while living, or made to his heirs or legatees after his
death. A principal beneficiary who is "identified but not vested" does
not have a heritable interest. If he lives long enough he receives corpus,
but the trust instrument provides for an automatic designation of another
beneficiary upon the first beneficiary's death. For example, a trust might
be established for John Smith to receive income, plus corpus at age
forty, but if he dies before age forty the benefits of the trust automatically go to the secondary beneficiaries designated in the trust instrument. If the principal beneficiary is "unidentified," he is determined
at a later date under the terms of the trust. An example of a trust with
principal beneficiaries unidentified at its creation is a trust paying income
to Jack and the principal to Jack's children living at his death. When
a trust is created for more than one income beneficiary, often the
principal beneficiaries are unidentified because the settlor desires flexibility concerning the ultimate recipients.
The principal beneficiaries of an American trust must be both identified and vested no later than the time limit set by the "rule against
perpetuities." A disposition in trust violating the rule against perpetuities
is completely invalid. All the states do not have the same rule against
perpetuities, but generally the rule requires vesting of interests in trust
principal no later than twenty-one years after the death of the last
surviving person specified in the trust instrument who is in being when
it is established.' 0
The rule against perpetuities allows a trust to remain intact for
generations. A typical trust that goes to the limit allowed under that
rule is one providing that (1) income is payable to whoever is currently
living among the settlor's children, children of deceased children, children
of deceased children of deceased children, and so forth, (2) if a descendant dies childless, other descendants of the settlor take that share,
(3) the trust terminates twenty-one years after the death of the last to
die of settlor's descendants living when the trust was established, and
(4) the trust corpus will be divided among all the descendants who are
income beneficiaries at the time of termination. We will call this type
of trust a "dynasty trust" because of its long duration and its goal of
preserving wealth in the family.

9. Scott, supra note 1, at §§ 113.1, 128.8; Bogert, supra note 5, at § 182. The
analysis in the text is presented for purposes of comparison with the Louisiana trust and
is not the type of analysis a common law trust expert is likely to use.
10. Scott, supra note 1, at § 62.10.
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Distributing Benefits
An American trust can take a great variety of approaches to distributions of income and corpus. The trust instrument may provide that
only income be distributed during the trust's term or allow principal to
be distributed in addition. Under the trust instrument, distributions can
be mandatory or in the discretion of the trustee or even a beneficiary.
A trustee's discretion may be either tied to objective standards or unbridled."
Duration of the Trust
The rule against perpetuities effectively limits the allowable term of
a trust, although in some cases a trust may continue for the remaining
2
lives of the vested beneficiaries.
Destructibility
If all beneficiaries and the settlor of an inter vivos trust agree, a
trust may be terminated before the term specified in the trust instrument.
If the settlor is dead or absent, generally the consent of all beneficiaries
suffices to terminate a trust regardless of the specified term unless
continuation is necessary to carry out a material purpose for which the
3
trust was created.'
Powers of Appointment
A person-often an income beneficiary-can be given a "power of
appointment," which is the power to designate recipients of trust principal. This can be a "general" power, which allows the holder to
designate anyone-including himself if exercised while living, or his estate
if exercised at death-as the recipient, or a "limited" power, which
requires appointment from a specified group of persons.' 4 A general
power to designate a recipient effectively makes the power holder the
vested principal beneficiary of the portion of the trust subject to that
power. An example of a limited power of designation is a trust under
which the settlor's surviving spouse receives the income for life and a
limited power to designate the recipients of principal from among the
settlor's children. The holder of a general or limited power has complete
discretion as to its exercise, subject to any limitation in the trust instrument, with no fiduciary obligation to designate anyone in particular.

11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at § 128.2-.8.
Id. at § 62.10.
Id. at §§ 337, 338.
Bogert, supra note 5, at

§ 273.35.
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Sale or Seizure of Beneficiary's Interest
A trust beneficiary can assign his interest in the trust, and his
interest can be seized by his creditors, unless the trust instrument contains
"spendthrift" restrictions. In all but a few states a "spendthrift trust"
can completely prevent a beneficiary from alienating his interest in
income. Similarly, in most states a vested interest in principal can also
be rendered non-alienable.'" Thus a beneficiary's interest that is safeguarded from the beneficiary himself is also protected to some extent
from seizure by his creditors. Even United States bankruptcy law gives
effect to spendthrift trust provisions to the extent recognized by applicable state law. 16 A trust established by a settlor for his own benefit,
however, cannot be a spendthrift trust.'7 Almost all trusts routinely
contain spendthrift restrictions.
BENEFICIAL USES OF AMERICAN

TRUSTS

Protecting the Beneficiary
Property can be controlled and preserved by a mature person or an
institution acting as trustee for a beneficiary who is known to be wasteful,
or for a young person until he reaches an age at which he is likely to
have the maturity to manage his property sensibly. The spendthrift clause
prevents the beneficiary from selling his interest in the trust and limits
creditor claims.
Ease of Managing An Incompetent's Property
The property of an interdict or a minor can be held and managed
for him without the necessity of court supervision. Also, the settlor can
appoint as trustee someone other than the person who has the right
under state law to administer the property owned outright by the interdict
or minor.

Ease of Management for Several Recipients
Even if all the beneficiaries are competent and money-wise, a trust
may be beneficial because it assures centralized management of property
and prevents a legatee of a fractional interest from either forcing a
partition sale of property or holding up a sale or other disposition of
property.

15.

16.
17.

Scott, supra note 1, at § 153.
11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1982).
Bogert, supra note 5, at § 223.
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Preservation of Propertyfor Subsequent Recipients
Property can be preserved to provide for consecutive beneficiaries.
Most often the beneficiaries are first, the surviving spouse, then the
children of the donor. Subject only to the rule against perpetuities,
however, a dynasty trust may benefit members of several generations
of income beneficiaries before the trust finally terminates.
Benefiting According to Situation
A person may establish a trust for a group of potential beneficiaries
and direct the trustee to make distributions only for specified purposes.
Thusa person's lifetime habit of giving pursuant to certain criteria can
be continued after death. The settlor may also delegate to the trustee
complete discretion in hopes that the trustee will make decisions similar
to those the settlor would have made.
Revocable Trusts as Will Substitutes
A person can establish a trust designating himself as income beneficiary and stipulate in the instrument how his successors will be designated at his death. The trust can be revocable while the settlor lives.
Such a trust is similar to a power of attorney or mandate during life.
Unlike a power of attorney, the trust can continue after the settlor's
death, and the property will devolve in essentially the same fashion as
under a will. The trustee retains title even after the settlor's death;
therefore, the property does not get tied up in the settlor's probate
estate. "s
Tax-Savings
Some tax benefits of donations can be enjoyed whether the gift is
made in trust or free of trust. 9 On the other hand, some tax savings
can be accomplished only through use of a trust. The following are
several ways that the federal tax system specifically encourages trusts.20
A trust is a separate taxpayer as to its undistributed taxable income.
To a limited extent income accumulated in trust can be taxed at a lower

18. Id. at § 233.
19. But if the donation is made in trust, special planning is sometimes required to
receive those tax benefits. For example, the Federal gift-tax annual exclusion, under §
2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (I.R.C.), is available only for gifts of
present interests. A gift in trust is not a present interest unless it meets certain requirements.
I.R.C. § 2503(c) (1989); Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b) (as amended in 1983); Rev. Rul. 73405, 1973-1 C.B. 321; Rev. Rul. 83-108, 1983-2 C.B. 167. For one method of meeting
this requirement, see infra text accompanying notes 94-98.
20. I.R.C. §§ 651, 661 (1989).
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rate than income that is distributed to a beneficiary who is in a high
2
tax bracket. 1
The Federal estate tax rules of the Internal Revenue Code allow a
marital deduction for a trust (a "QTIP" trust) of which the surviving
spouse is not the principal beneficiary, provided that the surviving spouse
currently receives all the income of the trust for life. 22 Before 1982,
such a trust qualified for the deduction only if the surviving spouse
also had a general power of appointment. 23 A QTIP trust allows a
testator- both to determine who will ultimately inherit his estate and to
assure that the assets available to produce income for his surviving
spouse are not reduced by the payment of estate tax.
A person who has a power to withdraw trust assets for himself is
deemed to have made a taxable gift when he allows someone else to
become the beneficiary of the assets, either through an exercise of the
power or a release of the power. 24 A release is not treated as a taxable
gift, however, to the extent that the value of the trust assets released
in a calendar year does not exceed the greater of five percent of the
trust assets or $5,000.25 Thus, within those limits an income beneficiary,
such as a surviving spouse, can be given the assurance that extra funds
will be available each year if desired but will not be taxed if the right
to withdraw is foregone.
Until recently, trusts could be used to bypass completely the federal
transfer tax system upon the death of an income beneficiary. If not
vested in principal, an income beneficiary has no interest in the trust
that passes as part of his probate estate at his death. Under the structure
of the federal estate tax system, neither the trust nor the income beneficiary's interest in such a trust is subject to estate tax at the income
beneficiary's death. 26 Thus, a trust establishing a child as income ben-

21. Under the current law the amount of the possible tax savings with each trust is
rather small. A trust enjoys a 15076 tax bracket only on its first $5,000 of taxable income.
The next $8,000 of taxable income is taxed at 2807o, with a 3307o tax rate on the next
$13,000 (to average the tax on the total income at a rate of 28%), and the remainder
taxed at 2806. I.R.C. §§ l(e), (g) (1989). Also, income accumulated while the beneficiary
is over the age of twenty-one may be subject to a "throwback" tax when the accumulated
income is distributed to him. I.R.C. § 665(b) (1989).
22. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1989). A usufruct for life also can qualify as QTIP. I.R.C.
§ 2056(b)(7) (1989). "QTIP" stands for "qualified terminable interest property." A trust
may also qualify for the marital deduction if the surviving spouse is the sole beneficiary
and the assets of the trust at that spouse's death are included in that spouse's probate
estate. Such a trust need not pay all income currently. Treas. Regs. § 20.2056(e)-2(b)(1)
(1958).
23. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) (1989).
24. I.R.C. § 2514(b) (1989).
25. I.R.C. § 2514(e) (1989). This is called a "5 and 5" power.
26. Williams v. United States, 41 F.2d 895 (Ct. Cl. 1930); Rev. Rul. 66-86, 1966-1
C.B. 216.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

eficiary and grandchildren as both successor income beneficiaries and
principal beneficiaries would save a level of estate tax by bypassing the
child's taxable estate. In a dynasty trust, estate taxes could be avoided

at two or more generation levels.
Now, however, a generation-skipping transfer tax is imposed on the

value of such trusts at an income beneficiary's death if the beneficiary
was a member of a younger generation than the settlor and his successor
beneficiaries are members of a still younger generation.2 7 This tax is at
tax rate schedule. 21

the highest rate-currently 55 percent-on the estate
The generation-skipping transfer tax allows several exemptions. Most
importantly, a donor has a one-million dollar exemption that he can
allocate to any trust. 29 If the exemption is applied to a dynasty trust
at its creation, the trust will avoid all generation-skipping taxes during
its term, and, of course, still avoids estate tax at each income beneficiary's death. Thus, the creation of generation-skipping trusts with up
to $1,000,000.00 in assets is still encouraged.
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE LOUISIANA TRUST CODE

When Louisiana had no law on trusts, attempts to create trusts in
Louisiana failed.30 Two aspects of the American trust are troubling to
a civilian system such as Louisiana's. One is the division of ownership
between the trustee and the beneficiary. Not only does the Louisiana
Civil Code not specifically authorize such a division of ownership, but

the Civil Code also used to contain an express prohibition of fidei
commissa.3' While this author would enjoy participating in the debate
over what was meant by fidei commissa,3 2 the question now is of
historical interest only. We need only note that the Louisiana Supreme
Court, relying in part on the opinion of a group of French scholars,33

27.

I.R.C. §§ 2601-2663 (1989). Exempt from this tax are transfers from irrevocable

intervivos trusts to the extent that they were funded before September 25, 1985, and trusts
under wills of persons dying before 1987, if the will was executed before October 22,
1986. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1433(b)(2), 100 Stat. 2718 (1986).
28. I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2641 (1989).

29.

I.R.C. § 2631 (1989).

30. For more on this era, see Wisdom, A Trust Code in the Civil Law, Based on
the Restatement and Uniform Acts: The Louisiana Trusts Estates Act, 13 Tul. L. Rev.
70 (1938), Nabors, Restrictions Upon the Ownership of Property in Louisiana-Trusts,
Fidei Commissa and Substitutions, 4 Tul. L. Rev. 190 (1930).
31. La. Civ. Code art. 1520 (prior to 1962).
32. See K. Cross, A Treatise on Successions, at 111-112 (1891); Tucker, Substitutions,
Fedei Commissa and Trusts in Louisiana Law: A Semantical Reappraisal, 24 La. L. Rev.
439 (1964); Lorio, supra note 3, at 1726.
33. See State v. Executors of McDonogh, 8 La. Ann. 171, 231, (1853), concerning
Mr. McDonogh's Will.
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believed that in forbidding fidei commissa the redactors of the Civil
34
Code meant to prohibit trusts.
A second feature of the American trust that presents problems to
the civilian is the ability to defer vesting of interests in trust corpus,
that is, to establish the trust without an immediately vested principal
beneficiary. Deferred vesting is contrary to civilian immediate vesting
concepts. The Louisiana Civil Code assumes that a person's successors
become seized of their inheritance as of the moment of death, and what
they inherit is immediately transmittable to their own heirs or legatees.3"
This concept is modified by the rules on renunciation of successions, 3 6
by the practical needs of a succession administration,3 7 and by the recent
enactment of a law allowing ninety-day survivorship clauses.3 s Nevertheless, any delay in vesting of benefits is of limited duration. All other
vesting of interests at a future date is still implicitly forbidden by the
Civil Code.
Related to this concept is the rule against substitutions.3 9 A substitution, as defined through the caselaw, is an arrangement under which
A inherits property, but is charged to preserve the property in order to
turn it over to B at A's death. Any disposition containing a substitution
is completely null and void. This severe penalty was justified on the
basis that the substitution kept the property out of commerce and
improperly attempted to write A's will for him? °
Even "conditional substitutions" were forbidden in most cases. 4' An
example would be, "to A, but if A dies before majority then to B."
Roman law, by contrast, permitted pupillary and exemplary substitutions
in which property left to A would pass to B if A died while a minor
or insane. 42 This is not to say that, under Louisiana law, a bequest
cannot be made subject to a condition. The Civil Code permits conditional bequests, which presumably are valid because the person who
43
owns the property subject to the condition can dispose of the property.
In Louisiana, however, testators have rarely made conditional bequests

34. See, e.g., Succession of McCan, 48 La. Ann. 145, 19 So. 220 (1896); Succession
of Franklin, 7 La. Ann. 395 (1852).
35. La. Civ. Code arts. 953, 992, 994, 1007, 1473, 1482.
36. La. Civ. Code arts. 1014-1031.
37. La. Civ. Code art. 871; La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3191, 3211.
38. La. Civ. Code art. 1521(A)(2).
39. La. Civ. Code art. 1520.
40. See, e.g., Marshall v. Pearce, 34 La. Ann. 557 (1882); Note, Wills-SubstitutionsArticle 1520, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, 18 Tul. L. Rev. 338 (1943).
41. See, e.g., Succession of Ledbetter, 147 La. 771, 85 So. 908 (1920); Succession
of McCan, 48 La. Ann. 145, 19 So. 220 (1896).
42. See Tucker, supra note 32, at 444.
43. La. Civ. Code arts. 1698, 1699; Comment, Testamentary Substitutions and Conditions, I Loy. L. Rev. 207, 219 (1942).
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for fear of inadvertently falling under the prohibition against substitutions.
As a corollary to the requirement of vesting at death, the Civil
Code forbids "willing through a third party." 44 A testator cannot give
to his executor or another party the power to affect how much of an
estate a beneficiary will receive. A recent amendment to Louisiana Civil
Code article 1573 does, however, permit giving the executor the power
to select assets to fund a bequest of a "quantum or value" of the
estate, determined "by formula or by specific sum." Although this
authorization is not as broadly, worded as some may wish, many practitioners believe Louisiana Civil Code article 1573 now authorizes giving
45
an executor discretion to fund any bequest of a fraction of an estate.
Of the two obstacles to full use of the American Trust-ownership
dichotomy and deferred vesting-the civilian distaste for deferred vesting
has been much the more serious; indeed, as will be seen, it continues
to have a major influence on the Trust Code today.
The legislature first authorized private trusts in 1920.46 Although the
division of ownership between trustee and beneficiary was no different
from that of an American trust, the legislature allowed the beneficiary
to be deprived of legal ownership for only a limited time; the trust
could terminate no later than ten years after the later of either the
donor's death or a minor beneficiary's reaching his majority. Of course
the beneficiary was implicitly vested at the creation of the trust. The
paucity of reported cases under the law suggests that it was little used.
In 1921, meanwhile, a rearguard action was mounted against trusts.
The newly adopted Louisiana Constitution of 1921 contained a provision
forbidding the legislature from "authorizing the creation of'substitutions,
fidei commissa or trust estates," except for trusts lasting no longer than
1920 Louisiana Acts No. 107 permitted: that is, for no more than ten
years from the later of either the donor's death or the beneficiary's
47
majority.
The 1920 trust law was repealed in 1935. Within three years the
legislature decided again that the benefits of the trust should not be
entirely spurned. In 1938, it enacted 97 articles comprising a much more
detailed law on "trust estates," ' 48 referred to as the "Trust Estates Law."
At first the new law was not much more beneficial than the 1920 Act
because of the term limitation still imposed by the constitution. In 1952
that barrier fell, 49 and for the first time Louisiana law allowed a trust

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

La. Civ. Code art. 1573.
See Hunter, Delegating Estate Asset Selection, 34 La. B.J. 78 (1986).
1920 La. Acts No. 107.
La. Const. 1921, art. IV, § 16 (superceded 1974).
Codified in 1950 as La. R.S. 9:1791-2212.
1952 La. Acts No. 208.
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to be established for the life of a beneficiary. In 1962 the legislature 0
paved the way for the Trust Code by (1) removing the prohibition of
fidei commissa from Louisiana Civil Code article 1520, and (2) with
the approval of the people, amending the constitution so that it no
longer prohibited fidei commissa but instead specifically allowed the
legislature to authorize substitutions in trusts. Finally in 1964, the
legislature" adopted a restatement of the Trust Estates Law, renamed
the "Louisiana Trust Code" (codified in Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:1721 through 2252); the over 200 articles of this code represented a
more sophisticated, complete, and flexible law of trusts. The Trust Code
was the product of four years of debate and drafting by the Louisiana
State Law Institute and a special Trust Advisory Committee of which
Leonard Oppenheim was the reporter.5 2 The final compromise version
of the Trust Code includes civilian vesting limitations, discussed below,
that can be frustrating to anyone used to American trusts, but otherwise
has proved workable and beneficial. The few changes made to the Trust
Code since 1964 have chiefly been motivated by a desire to ease its
vesting restrictions.
CHARACTERISTICS OF LOUISIANA

TRUSTS AS COMPARED TO "AMERICAN"

TRUSTS

The following is a description of the features of the Louisiana trust
currently permitted under the Louisiana Trust Code, using the same
topic headings as those above describing the American trust.
Dual Ownership
Like all of Louisiana's trust laws, the Trust Code accepts the common law dichotomy of ownership: title to the property is in the trustee,
but the benefits of ownership are owed to the beneficiary. 3
Creating the Trust
A Louisiana trust must be in writing, thus, intentionally established.
A trust can be established during life by an act signed before two

50. 1962 La. Acts No. 45 and 521.
51.
1964 La. Acts No. 338.
52. The pros and cons of some of the policy decisions ultimately made are discussed
in Oppenheim, A New Trust Code for Louisiana: Some Basic Policy Considerations, 23
La. L. Rev. 621 (1963); Pascal, Of Trusts, Human Dignity, Legal Science and TaxesSuggested Principles for a Louisiana Trust Estates Law, 23 La. L. Rev. 639 (1963);
Oppenheim, A New Trust Code for Louisiana-Act 338 of 1964, 39 Tul. L. Rev. 187
(1965) [hereinafter Oppenheim, Trust Code].
53. La. R.S. 9:1731, 2082 (1965).
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witnesses and a notary;5 4 moreover, a trust can be established by will
at death." The form requirements for lifetime trusts are much stricter
under Louisiana law than in the other states.
Identifying the Beneficiaries
The Trust Estates Law seemed to allow a trust to have one or more
beneficiaries of income (an "income beneficiary") different from the
beneficiary or beneficiaries who ultimately receive the trust corpus (a
"principal beneficiary"); but any doubt on that score was removed in
6
1962, and the Trust Code clearly permits such an arrangement .
Unlike requirements for American trusts, however, Louisiana law
requires that all beneficiaries, including principal beneficiaries and successor income beneficiaries, be designated and vested from the inception
of the trust.17 The seizin principles of the Louisiana Civil Code" have
thus been extended to trusts. Vested rights in trust principal must be
heritable, 9 except to the extent shifts are permitted at a beneficiary's
death. 60 The requirement of immediate vesting prevents the use of the
dynasty trust to the full extent that it is used in the American trust.
Even in the class trust, as described below, a generation can share in
a trust only if a member of the class is in being when the trust is
created; furthermore, the class generally cannot include great-grand6
children, great-grandnieces, or great-grandnephews. 1
A beneficiary of a trust does not have to be an individual. The
1989 legislature modified the Trust Code to make it clear that a trustee
of one trust can be the beneficiary of another trust. 62 Probably, the
beneficiary trust must be a valid Louisiana trust. Naming a trust as a
beneficiary of a trust may allow a settlor to do indirectly what he cannot
do directly. For example, under the Trust Code, the right to trust income
is not heritable. 63 If John Doe is only an income beneficiary of trust
A, the trust instrument cannot stipulate that at his death his heirs or
legatees succeed to his right to income. But if trust B, of which John

54. La. R.S. 9:1752 (1965).
55. La. R.S. 9:1751 (1965).
56. Former La. R.S. 9:1903 (1949) (amended 1962, repealed 1964); current La. R.S.
9:1805 (1965).
57. Former La. R.S. 9:1902 (1949) (repealed 1964); current La. R.S. 9:1802, 1803
(1965).
58. See supra note 35.
59. La. R.S. 9:1972 (1965).
60. See infra notes 77-84.
61. La. R.S. 9:1891 (1965). A member of the third lower generation can, however,
be a member of the class by representation. La. R.S. 9:1894 (1965).
62. 1989 La. Acts No. 110, modifying La. R.S. 9:1801 (1965).
63. La. R.S. 9:1964 (1965).
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Doe is sole beneficiary, is itself the income beneficiary of trust A, then
John Doe's heirs or legatees, as successors to his interest in trust B,
apparently can receive through trust B the income from trust A after
John Doe's death until either trust A or trust B terminates.
Three exceptions to the rule of immediate vesting have emerged:
the class trust exception, the revocable trust exception, and the limited
ability to make shifts at death.
Class Trusts
If a trust is established for a class consisting of some or all of the
settlor's children or grandchildren, or both, the Trust Code allows
members of the class born or adopted after the trust is established to
become beneficiaries.6 A class can be the designated beneficiary only
if at least one member of the class is in being at the inception of the
trust. 65 Since 1982 it has been possible to establish a class trust not only
for any of the settlor's children or grandchildren, but also for any of
66
the settlor's nieces, nephews, grandnieces, and grandnephews.
Because the class trust is generally the only way to provide for laterborn individuals in an irrevocable trust, its limitations can be frustrating.
However, a person can sometimes circumvent these limitations. The
settlor of a trust is not the only person who can donate to it.67 Thus,
a person having the requisite relationship to a group can set up a class
trust for them; then someone not having the requisite relationship can
make a donation to it. For example, John Doe cannot establish a class
trust for his great-grandchildren; but if John's daughter Mary establishes
a bona fide class trust for her grandchildren, John can make a gift to
that trust.
Revocable Trusts
Since 1938 it has been possible to establish a revocable inter vivos
trust; that is, the settlor makes a donation into trust during life but
reserves the power to revoke the trust in order to take back the donation. 68 Thus, the donation is incomplete until the trust becomes irrevocable. In 1988, on the recommendation of the Louisiana State Law
Institute, the Trust Code was amended to permit a revocable trust to
defer designating the income and principal beneficiaries until a date after
the creation of the trust, but not after the trust becomes irrevocable. 69

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

La. R.S.
La. R.S.
1982 La.
La. R.S.
La. R.S.
La. R.S.

9:1891-1896 (1965 and Supp. 1990).
9:1891 (Supp. 1990).
Acts No. 479, amending La. R.S. 9:1891 (1965).
9:1931 (1965).
9:2171 (1949) (repealed 1964); La. R.S. 9:2041 (1965).
9:2011 (Supp. 1990).
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The trust will usually become irrevocable at the death of the settlor.
The beneficiaries identified at the later date do not have to be in being
at the time the trust is created. 70 If no beneficiary-as defined in the
trust instrument-is in being when the beneficiaries are to be determined,
the settlor or his estate is deemed to be the beneficiary. 7 '
This new exception to the requirement of immediate vesting of
beneficial interests is without precise analogy in the Civil Code. 7 The
Civil Code does not allow an inter vivos donation to be made to a
person who will be identified later. 73 The Civil Code does, however,
describe several situations in which inter vivos donations can be taken
away, depending on future events occurring up to and including the
donor's death. These include the right of the donor to revoke a gift
for ingratitude,7 4 the right of the forced heirs to reduce gifts, 75 and the
right of the donor to take back a gift when the donee dies before the
donor. 76 This legislative change, therefore, is not a major tear in the
civilian fabric because at least vesting of interests at death is preserved.
In order to avoid abuse of this provision, Trust Code article 2014
unequivocally provides that a revocable trust with deferred vesting can
have only one settlor. Having more than one settlor would be inconsistent
with the immediate vesting rule. The trust could remain revocable after
the death of one of the settlers, according to Trust Code article 2044,
and consequently, vesting of interests in property donated into the trust
by the deceased settlor would be deferred until after his death.
If a non-settlor makes an addition to the trust and dies before the
settlor, it is true that the ultimate recipient of his property, if it remains
in the trust, will be determined after the death of that donor. This does
not, however, present a violation of the immediate vesting rule. The
addition to the trust is an immediately vested gift to the trust's settlor
because he has the ability to revoke or amend the trust and thus dispose
of the third party's gift as he wishes.
Substitutions at Death
Upon the original principal beneficiary's death, in certain specified
circumstances the trust instrument can designate another person or persons as substitute principal beneficiaries. This ability to substitute prin-

70. Id.
71. La. R.S. 9:2013 (Supp. 1990).
72. The revocable trust itself is also without analogy because a donation free of trust
cannot be revocable at will. La. Civ. Code art. 1529.
73. La. Civ. Code art. 1473.
74. La. Civ. Code arts. 1559-1569.
75. La. Civ. Code arts. 1501-1518.
76. La. Civ. Code art. 1534.
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cipal beneficiaries was first allowed in the 1964 Code in the context of
class trusts. 77 It was extended to other types of trusts in 1974.78 In 1989,
on the recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute, Trust Code
article 1973 was amended 79 to allow successive substitutions. This means,
for example, that if four siblings are initial principal beneficiaries, and
the surviving three succeed to the interest of the first to die, when a
second sibling dies the trust instrument can direct that both the second
sibling's original interest and his substitute interest pass to the surviving
two siblings.
Although called "substitutions," these shifts of principal interest at
death are by no means tantamount to the "prohibited substitution,"
and are not widely available because of the following limitations:
80
Such a shift is not allowed if the principal beneficiary leaves a will.
The heart of the immediate vesting rule is the ability to leave the property
to one's legatees. As mentioned, the Louisiana Supreme Court found
the substitution especially offensive because it diminished the instituted
beneficiary's power of testation. The Trust Code continues to promote
that power of testation.8 '
Such a shift is also not allowed if the principal beneficiary is survived
by any descendants.12 This rule is a reflection of the strong state policy
favoring descendant heirs.8 3
Until 1982 it was necessary that the substitute beneficiary be in
being and ascertainable at the inception of the trust. A significant change
was made in 1982: if the substitute beneficiaries in a non-class trust are
descendants of the settlor, the instrument can provide for determination
of the substitute beneficiaries at the date of the original principal beneficiary's death rather than at the creation of the trust.8 4 Thus, descendants born after the trust is created can be substitute beneficiaries.
This clause has limited application; non-descendant substitute beneficiaries, and substitute beneficiaries of a class trust, still must be in being
and ascertainable upon the creation of the trust.

77. La. R.S. 9:1895 (1965).
78. La. R.S. 9:1973-1978 (Supp. 1990).
79. 1989 La, Acts No. I11.
80. La. R.S. 9:1895, 1973 (Supp. 1990).
81. It should be noted that the legislature, in 1972, defeated the first attempt to
allow shifts in non-class trusts. The 1972 version would have allowed shifts even when
the deceased beneficiary died testate. Oppenheim, The 1972 Amendments to the Trust
Code of 1964, 47 Tul. L. Rev. 315 (1973). For an argument in favor of deleting this
limitation, see Lemann, Conditional Substitutions in Trust, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 346 (1976).
82. La. R.S. 9:1894, 1973 (Supp. 1990).
83. For a discussion of the forced portion in trust, see infra text accompanying notes
139-43.
84. La. R.S. 9:1978 (Supp. 1990).
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The substitution upon the intestate death of the original beneficiary
in the absence of descendants is most likely to occur when a beneficiary
dies young or is mentally retarded. Thus, the objectives of the pupillary
and examplary substitutions of Roman law can generally be accomplished
now in Louisiana.
Distributing Benefits
Unlike the rules for American trusts, the Trust, Code imposes very
different restraints on the distribution of income as compared to corpus
distributions.
Distributions of Income
A trustee has available three possible types of discretion concerning
the payment of income: discretion as to timing of payments to beneficiaries, discretion as to allocation of income between beneficiaries, and
discretion as to allocation of receipts and expenditures between income
and principal.
A trustee can be given complete discretion to determine when a
beneficiary's income is distributed.8 5 Accumulated income remains, however, vested in the income beneficiary and must eventually be distributed
6
to him, or to his heirs or legatees.
The Trust Estates Law did not expressly allow settlors to authorize
trustees to allocate income between beneficiaries; presumably, therefore,
the trust instrument had to stipulate the fraction of income allocated
to each beneficiary. Under the Trust Code, however, it has been possible
for a trust instrument to authorize the trustee to allocate income between
income beneficiaries pursuant to "an objective standard established in
the trust instrument. ' 81 This is believed to permit a settlor to stipulate
in a trust instrument not only that beneficiary A will receive, for example,
one-third of the trust income, or the first $5,000 of trust income each
year, but also that beneficiary A's share be determined through exercise
of the trustee's judgment, such as by a stipulation that A will receive
only that portion of the income he needs for his support, maintenance,
education, or medical expenses. The amount not needed by beneficiary
A can be allocated to beneficiary B or allocated to principal.
The Trust Code contains detailed rules on the allocation of receipts
and charges between the income and principal interests in trust.18 A

85. La. R.S. 9:1963 (1965).
86. La. R.S. 9:1964 (1965). This does not appear to be true, however, as to class
trusts. La. R.S. 9:1985 (1965).
87. La. R.S. 9:1961 (1965).
88. La. R.S. 9:2144-2157 (1965).
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trust instrument can deviate from these rules. s9 In addition, the settlor
can give the trustee discretion to allocate between income and principal
in a manner different from that provided in the Trust Code, provided
that the allocation is "reasonable and equitable in view of the interests
of those entitled to income as well as those entitled to principal." 9
As discussed below under "Trusts and the Forced Portion," a trust
of the forced portion must distribute income currently to the forced
heir. The forced heir could thus contest a testator's attempt to burden
his forced portion by putting it into a trust subject to any of the powers
and limitations described above.
Distributions of Principal
Considerable latitude can be given to the trustee or anyone else to
determine when trust corpus is paid to the principal beneficiary. 9' More
complex rules apply if principal is to be distributed to someone other
than the principal beneficiary.
To be entirely consistent with civilian vesting concepts, the Trust
Code would require principal in all cases to be distributed only to the
principal beneficiary who is determined upon the creation of the trust.
Indeed, it was implicit in the 1920 and 1938 Acts that the principal
beneficiary would receive the trust corpus in due course. Under the
current Trust Code, however, the trust instrument can provide for shifts
of trust principal from one beneficiary to another in certain specified
circumstances. The substitution at death, described above, 92 is just one
such situation. The opportunities for such shifts have been considerably
increased since 1964, particularly by changes, described below, made by
the 1989 legislature upon the recommendation of the Louisiana State
Law Institute. The rule of immediate vesting, however, still significantly
limits these opportunities.
Distribution to Income Beneficiary Under Objective Standards
Louisiana Trust Code article 2068(A) allows a trustee to distribute
principal to one beneficiary although it is vested in another beneficiary.
The recipient must be an income beneficiary, and the "invasion" must
be permitted under objective standards set forth in the trust instrument.
Invasion, when the objective standards are met, is either (i) required,
in which case the trustee, as the settlor's agent, can be liable to the

89.
90.
official
text by
91.
92.

La. R.S. 9:2142(1) (1965).
La. R.S. 9:2142(3) (Supp. 1990). This authorization was formerly only in an
comment but on the recommendation of the Law Institute was elevated to the
1989 La. Acts No. 114.
La. R.S. 9:2025 (1965), 2068(B) (Supp. 1990).
See supra text accompanying notes 77-84.
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beneficiary in need if he fails to act as the instrument requires; or (ii)
permitted, in which case the trustee is free to decide whether to make
the allowed invasion without being liable to any beneficiary.
As originally enacted, invasion had to be for "support, maintenance,
education, medical expenses, or welfare under objective standards set
forth in the trust instrument." It was not entirely clear whether the
"welfare" clause would allow a trust instrument to permit invasion for
purposes other than support, maintenance, education and medical expenses. Could invasion be allowed to purchase a home, or to enable
the beneficiary to enter a business? The 1989 restatement of this section 93
makes it clear that the invasion can be for any purpose set forth in
the trust instrument. The 1989 change also makes it clear that "support,
maintenance, education, and medical expenses" are in themselves objective standards; formerly, cautious practitioners would generally add
a standard such as "to maintain the beneficiary at his standard of
living."
Withdrawal Power
Louisiana Trust Code article 2068(A) was also amended in 198994
to permit a settlor to provide in a trust instrument that an income
beneficiary may withdraw, at his discretion, trust corpus up to a specified
dollar amount or percentage. For example, a trust for descendants as
principal beneficiaries can allow the settlor's spouse, if an income beneficiary, to take amounts in addition to income without having to prove
need. The income beneficiary's failure to exercise this withdrawal right
amounts to a gift to the principal beneficiaries. But, as already mentioned, 95 a special provision of the Internal Revenue Code 96 exempts
such a lapse from gift tax provided that the amount of the lapse does
not exceed 5 percent of the trust corpus, or $5,000, if gieater. Settlors
may wish to limit the withdrawal power of an income beneficiary so
that the value of the lapsed amount will fall within the gift-tax-free
parameters of this "5 and 5" power.
The new withdrawal power also solves a difficulty in making annual
tax excludable gifts to trusts having different income and principal
beneficiaries. A person can exclude from federal gift tax donations to
an individual of an amount up to $10,000 a year derived from "presentinterests" in property. 97 A gift in trust is not a present interest unless

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

1989 La. Acts No. 113.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 25.
I.R.C. § 2514(e) (1989).
I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1989).
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it meets one or more specific tests. 98 One can manufacture a present
interest by giving a beneficiary the temporary power to withdraw the
gift from the trust. 99 Prior to 1989, the Trust Code did not expressly
authorize giving a withdrawal power to an income beneficiary; only the
principal beneficiary could be given that power.?° If the principal beneficiary were given the power, however, he could be deemed the "grantor" of the trust for federal income tax purposes, and thus be taxed
on some, if not all, of the income subsequently produced by the donated
property in the trust even though the income was paid to someone else
as income beneficiary.' 0' If the income beneficiary has the withdrawal
power, as now permitted, this income-tax problem is substantially avoided
because the income beneficiary will be taxed on the distributed income
anyway.
Addition of Class Member
As implied in the above discussion of class trusts, 01 2 the birth or
adoption of a new member of the class reduces the interests of the
other members of the class.
Duration of Trust
As mentioned, in 1952 the maximum term for a trust became the
life of the beneficiary, or ten years from the settlor's death, whichever
is longer. In the 1964 Trust Code, the maximum term was extended to
the longer of (a) fifteen years from the death of the last surviving settlor,
or (b) the death of the last surviving income beneficiary. The fifteen
year limit was extended to twenty in 1968.103 If the trust instrument
stipulates an excessive term, the term is reduced to the maximum allowed

without penalty.

04

Because the term of a trust for several beneficiaries is governed by
the death of the last one, it may continue for many years after the
first one dies. Only the lives of designated beneficiaries can govern the
term, not the lives of heirs, assignees, or substitute beneficiaries.0 " Even
so, it is quite possible for a Louisiana trust to last for a very long
time. For example, a class trust for children and grandchildren, estab-

98. See supra note 19.
99. Crummey v. Commissioner, 398 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968); Rev. Rul. 73-465, 19731 C.B. 321; Rev. Rul. 83-108, 1983-2 C.B. 167.
100. La. R.S. 9:2025 (1965).
101. 1.R.C. § 678(a) (1989).
102. See supra text accompanying note 64.
103. La. R.S. 9:1831 (Supp. 1990).
104. La. R.S. 9:1832 (Supp. 1990).
105. La. R.S. 9:1801, 1835 (1965).
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lished when the first child is born and lasting until the death of the
last surviving grandchild, could have a term of more than 100 years.
Destructibility
In the debate over the Trust Code, one issue was whether the
beneficiaries should be able to terminate a trust at will. A rule allowing
termination would be in acccord with the civilian policy behind the
prohibition of fidei commissa: if a person who is both income and
principal beneficiary is able to make himself full owner, even if contrary
to the intention of the settlor, the trust would be less of a departure
01 6
from the Civil Code's former prohibition of dismembered ownership.
Because the law of American trusts sometimes allows beneficiaries to
terminate a trust early, it seemed that some measure of destructibility
might be incorporated in the Trust Code. As adopted, however, the
Trust Code specifically prohibited in all situations destruction of a trust
0 7
by consent of all interested parties.
The parties desiring to terminate a trust early may, however, be
able to obtain relief from the court. The Trust Code allows the proper
court to terminate a trust before the end of its stipulated term if (1)
a person who is both income and principal beneficiary is in need, 08 or
(2) the court finds that circumstances have changed such that "the
continuation of the trust would defeat or substantially impair the purposes of the trust,"' 9 or (3) the court finds that the purpose for which
the trust was established has become impossible or illegal." 0 Although
each of these rules appears to have very limited application, experience
has shown that the change of circumstances rule is quite helpful. Often
the sole beneficiary of a trust has been able to obtain an early termination
when the change of circumstances was nothing more significant than,
for example, the beneficiary having grown up and demonstrated that
he could handle the trust funds just fine on his own. As long as all
parties agree, judges are generally obliging. One wonders whether the
judges' receptivity is grounded in the civilian belief that a person with
all of the benefits of ownership should also have all of the powers of
ownership.
Powers of Appointment
Generally speaking, the Trust Code does not allow powers of appointment. Such powers are inconsistent with the requirement that ben-

106. See discussion at Oppenheim, supra note 52, at 629; Pascal, supra note 52, at
644; Oppenheim, Trust Code, supra note 52, at 190.
107. La. R.S. 9:2028 (1965).
108. La. R.S. 9:2067 (1965).
109. La. R.S. 9:2026 (1965).
110. La. R.S. 9:2027 (1965).
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eficiaries be identified and vested when the trust is created. They also,
of course, violate the Civil Code prohibition against willing one's property through third parties. The Trust Code, however, in several places
allows a trust intrument to give to trustees or other persons discretionary
powers affecting beneficial enjoyment. If the exercise of such a power
is not subject to a fiduciary obligation, so that the discretion of the
power holder is truly complete, the power has all the earmarks of a
power of appointment.
Some powers that can be given to a trustee of a Louisiana trust
allow him to act with broad discretion, but within the limits of an
objective standard. These include the power to allocate income,", and
the power to decide whether an income beneficiary's need justifies invasion of the principal." 2 An arbitrary exercise of these powers can be
checked. These are clearly not powers of appointment.
On the other hand, the following powers that affect beneficial enjoyment may not be subject to a fiduciary duty:
As mentioned above," 3 a trustee can be given the power to invade
principal for an income beneficiary providing that the invasion complies
with objective standards. If the objective standard is met, but the instrument merely permits rather than directs the trustee to make the
distribution, his choice amounts to a power of appointment of sorts.
If the trustee, instead, is required to distribute principal pursuant to
the objective standards, he does not have a power of appointment
because the distribution of principal can be enforced by the affected
income beneficiary.
The trustee or another person can be given the unfettered power to
terminate a trust." 4 When the income and principal beneficiaries are not
the same, the termination will cut off the rights of the income beneficiary.
Unless a fiduciary obligation to the income beneficiary is read into the
statute, the power to terminate is a sort of power of appointment.
If the power to amend the trust instrument has been reserved, all
surviving competent settlors must concur in the modification." 5 A modification made by a competent settlor affecting an incompetent beneficiary's interest would amount to a power of appointment as to that
interest.
A revocable trust created by more than one settlor is revocable by
all "surviving competent settlors." '" 6 Because the share of a deceased
111. La. R.S. 9:1961 (1965).
112. La. R.S. 9:2068(A) (Supp. 1990).
113. See supra text accompanying note 93.
114. La. R.S. 9:2025 (1965).
115. La. R.S. 9:2024 (1965).
116. La. R.S. 9:2044 (1965). The text adds "in the absence of a contrary stipulation."
It is not clear what this can mean since La. R.S. 9:2045 (1965) forbids delegation of the
right to revoke.
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or incompetent settlor in the trust can be revoked by the remaining
competent settlors, they have a sort of power of appointment over his
share of the trust.
Sale or Seizure of Beneficiary's Interest
Spendthrift protection, although a further step away from the civilian
idea that an owner should have control over his property, is essential
to assure that the purposes of a trust are carried out. Spendthrift trust
clauses were first permitted in the 1938 Trust Estates Law, but only as
to income interests."" A 1944 change extended the protection to interests
in principal. Louisiana's spendthrift trust rules" 8 are now similar to
those of the other states that give effect to spendthrift trust clauses. A
beneficiary of a Louisiana spendthrift trust cannot alienate his interest." 9
The beneficiary's interest is protected from all debt obligations except
child support, alimony, tort claims, and necessary services or supplies. 20
Formerly, the right to income was protected from creditors as to only
the first $10,000 a year.' 2' The limit was raised to $20,000 in 1985 and
removed altogether in 1987.
BENEFICIAL USES OF LOUISIANA TRUSTS

The following discussion parallels the above discussion of the ben22
eficial uses of "American" trusts.
Protecting the Beneficiary
A Louisiana trust is equally as useful as an American trust for this
purpose.
Ease of Managing An Incompetent's Property
A Louisiana trust is equally as useful as an American trust for this
purpose.
Preservation of Property for Subsequent Recipients
Since the Louisiana Trust Code requires immediate vesting of interests, and heritability of intersts in trust principal, the Louisiana trust

117.

La. R.S. 9:1923 (1949) (repealed 1964).

118. La.
119. La.
120. La.
be seized to

R.S. 9:2001-2007 (1965 and Supp. 1990).
R.S. 9:2002 (1965).
R.S. 9:2005 (1965). A beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust can also
satisfy federal tax liabilities. I.R.C. § 6321 (1989); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 636 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. 11. 1986).
121.
La. R.S. 9:2004(2) (1965).
122. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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is less effective than the American trust to preserve property for subsequent recipents.
Benefiting According to Situation
In certain circumstances, a Louisiana trust is less useful than an
American trust for this purpose. A settlor, for example, can establish
a "pot trust" for his grandchildren that will pay income and principal
only for those grandchildren who currently need funds for education.
Unneeded income can be added to principal. However, the trustee cannot
be given the complete discretion that the settlor would have had to
dispose of the property.
Revocable Trusts as Will Substitutes
As a will substitute, the revocable trust probably will work as well
in Louisiana as in other states. The interests of the principal beneficiaries
can now vest in a Louisiana revocable inter vivos trust at the death of
the settlor; they no longer have to vest when the trust is established.
Persons who are born into or die out of the group of potential beneficiaries between the time that the trust is established and the settlor
dies will automatically be included or removed as beneficiaries. The
settlor can probably even direct in the trust instrument that the revocable
trust be split into separate trusts for different beneficiaries when the
trust becomes irrevocable.
Tax-Savings
All significant tax-saving benefits of American trusts can be realized
using Louisiana trusts. 23
TRUSTS AND THE FORCED PORTION

Louisiana is the only American state that reserves a "forced portion"
for descendant heirs. 24 Forced heirship has been considered so important
that it is protected by the state constitution. 25 Nevertheless, the citadel
of forced heirship is under attack. In 1980, the forced portion for three
or more children was reduced from two-thirds to one-half of the de-

123. The marital deduction allowed under I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) (1989), that is, through
a trust giving the surviving spouse income for life and a general power of appointment,
is not available in Louisiana. This is no longer a hardship, however, because the QTIP
trust under I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1989) provides the benefits of such a trust without having
to give the spouse a power of appointment. See supra text accompanying note 22. In the
other states, where either type of trust can be used, the QTIP trust is usually chosen.
124. La. Civ. Code art. 1493.
125. La. Const. art. XII § 5.
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ceased's estate, and the forced portion of only one child was reduced
from one-third to one-fourth; the forced portion of two children remains
one-half. Furthermore, proceeds of insurance policies on the decedent's
life, premiums paid on such policies, 2 6 benefits under qualified plans,
individual retirement accounts, 12 7 and gifts to charity made more than
three years prior to death 28 have all been exempted in recent years from
the calculation of the forced portion. In 1989 the legislature abolished
forced heirship for any child (and his descendants) who reaches his
twenty-third birthday. 2 9 This change is not scheduled to go into effect
until July 1, 1990, and may well be modified by the legislature before
then.
The forced portion can be burdened with a usufruct in favor of
the surviving spouse. At one time, the usufruct could be imposed only
if the surviving spouse was the other parent of the forced heir, only
as to community property of the decedent, and only until remarriage
of the surviving spouse. 30 The deceased spouse can now leave the
surviving spouse a usufruct for life over all the decedent's property
regardless of whether the surviving spouse is the other parent of the

heirs. '31
The approach of all of Louisiana's trust laws to forced heirship has
been the same: testators are allowed to place the forced portion into
trust only if the trust is subject to special requirements assuring benefits
comparable to the benefits of ownership free of trust.
Basic Requirements
Both the 1920 trust law and the Trust Estates Law 3 2 required that
the income attributable to the forced portion be distributed currently.
The 1964 Trust Code incorporated that rule and added others. A trust
of the forced portion, when the testator's surviving spouse is not income
beneficiary, must comply with the following rules:
All income (net of charges against income) must be distributed
currently, at least as often as once a year.133 Furthermore, the trust
must be invested so as to produce a reasonable income for the forced

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

La. Civ.
La. Civ.
La. R.S.
1989 La.
La. Civ.
La. Civ.
La. R.S.
Id.

Code art. 1505(C).
Code art. 1505(D).
9:2372 (Supp. 1990).
Acts No. 788.
Code art. 916 (prior to 1975).
Code art. 890.
9:1841(1) (1965).
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heir. The settlor's authorization or direction to retain unproductive prop4
erty may, therefore, be ineffective.1
The trust must terminate as to the forced portion no later than
upon the forced heir's death.' This maximum term is shorter than that
of other Louisiana trusts. The usual rules applicable to the death of a
principal beneficiary apply: the principal passes to the heirs or legatees
of the forced heir; but if he dies intestate and without descendants, the
13 6
instrument can direct a shift to persons other than his heirs.
31 7
The forced heir must be the principal beneficiary of the trust,
even though he can be limited to receiving only income during his life.
The forced heir, thus, is assured of the right to dispose of the trust
corpus at his death.
The forced heir's interest can be subject to no additional "charges
or conditions" other than the surviving spouse's income interest described
in the following section. 3
To What Extent Can Benefits for the Surviving Spouse Burden the
Forced Portion in Trust?
The brief provisions for the forced portion in trust contained in the
1920 and 1938 Acts did not mention the testator's surviving spouse.
Therefore, both appeared to forbid naming the surviving spouse as
income beneficiary of the forced portion in trust. Those Acts probably
presented no impediment, however, to placing the forced portion in
trust subject to a usufruct in the surviving spouse.
Since 1964, the Trust Code has made the usufruct unnecessary; it
allows the surviving spouse to be income beneficiary of a trust of the
forced portion "to the same extent and for the same term" that the
surviving spouse could be usufructuary of it. 139 Thus, the rules set forth
above regarding the forced heir's right to income apply only when the
forced portion is not subject to an income provision for the surviving
spouse. When the surviving spouse is income beneficiary, the trust does
not have to terminate when the forced heir dies first, but can continue
until the settlor's surviving spouse dies. 14°
The Trust Code's provisions allocating receipts between income and
principal beneficiaries are not the same as the Civil Code's provisions

134. See Succession of Dunham, 393 So. 2d 438, 451 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 408 So. 2d 888 (1981); Succession of Burgess, 359 So. 2d 1006
(La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 360 So. 2d 1179 (1978).
135. La. R.S. 9:1841(3) (Supp. 1990).
136. See La. R.S. 9:1841(2) (Supp. 1990).
137. La. R.S. 9:1841(4) (1965).
138. La. R.S. 9:1841(2) (Supp. 1990).
139. La. R.S. 9:1844 (Supp. 1990).
140. La. R.S. 9:1842(3) (Supp. 1990).
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allocating receipts between a usufructuary and a naked owner.' 41 As a
consequence, a surviving spouse entitled to income from the forced
portion held in trust may not receive the same amount of money as a
surviving spouse having a usufruct over the same property. The forced
heir apparently has no complaint if the Trust Code allocations result
in his receiving a smaller benefit than he would have received from a
naked ownership free of trust; the "to the same extent" language of
Trust Code article 1844 refers to the ability to burden the forced portion
at all rather than to a requirement that the allocation of revenue to
the forced heir be identical. The forced heir probably does have recourse,
however, if the trust instrument causes a larger share of revenue to be
allocated to the surviving spouse than the share specified in Trust Code,
even if the spouse would be entitled to the larger share if the benefit
were left in usufruct. 142 For example, if minerals are placed in a forced
portion trust and the surviving spouse is income beneficiary, the share
of royalty revenues allocated to principal (the depletion reserve) probably
must be at least as great as the 27 1/2 percent rate stipulated in the
Trust Code, 143 even if the surviving spouse as usufructuary would have
been entitled to 100 percent of the revenues.
The surviving spouse's benefits from the forced portion are limited
to income. The trustee cannot distribute to the surviving spouse any
trust principal that is part of the forced portion, regardless of the
surviving spouse's need, unless the forced heir agrees.
If a trust provision overburdens the forced portion, normally only
the impermissible burden is invalid rather than the entire trust.'4
SUSTAINING A

DEFECTIVE TRUST

Shortly before the Trust Code was enacted, the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Succession of Guillory 4l and the Louisiana Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Succession of Meadors46 invalidated dispositions in trust as containing substitutions. The broad, cryptic language
used in the two decisions made the redactors of the 1964 Trust Code
nervous. It was not clear whether the courts struck down the trusts in
question-which were contained in non-Louisiana wills obviously drafted
without reference to the unique limitations of Louisiana law-because
of their numeorus violations of Louisiana vesting principles, or because

141. Compare La. R.S. 9:2144-2157 (1965) with La. Civ. Code arts. 550-565 and La.
R.S. 31:188-196 (1989).
142. See La. R.S. 9:1844, comment (c) (1965).
143. La. R.S. 9:2152(A)(3) (1965).
144. La. R.S. 9:1842 (1965).

145.

Succession of Guillory, 232 La. 213, 94 So. 2d 38 (1957).

146.

Succession of Meadors, 135 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
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the trust concept itself was inimical.' 47 To maximize the likelihood that
a trust under the Trust Code would be sustained, the redactors took
the following steps:
1) To make it clear that the Civil Code's rule against substitutions
4
does not override Trust Code provisions, the Trust Code in three places' 1
states that a substitution in trust authorized by the Trust Code is valid
even if it would be invalid if made free of trust.
2) Most litigation over the validity of trusts involves poorly drafted
documents. As a matter of policy, Louisiana Civil Code article 1713
requires that an ambiguous provision of a testament be interpreted so
as to give it effect. The courts, while giving lip service to that policy,
have not always followed it in substitution cases.149 To emphasize this
rule of construction, the Trust Code also specifically provides that "[a]
trust instrument shall be given an interpretation that will sustain the
effectiveness of its provisions if the trust instrument is susceptible of
such an interpretation." 0
3) Finally, if a court should find that the settlor of a trust unambiguously intended an invalid disposition, the Trust Code states that
the invalid provision in the trust instrument does not cause the trust to
fail "unless the invalid provision cannot be separated from the other
provisions without defeating the purpose of the trust."' 5'
Based on these provisions, what is a court to do with a defective
trust, such as a trust document that contains substitution-type provisions
not authorized by the Trust Code? This author submits that the effect
of any invalid provision in a trust document, even if in the nature of
a substitution, must be determined not under the Civil Code but under
article 2251 of the Trust Code: the invalid provision should be stricken
without defeating the validity of the trust unless it affects the very
purpose of the trust; only then does the trust fail. Under this rule a
provision in the trust having the characteristics of a prohibited substi-

147. See a discussion of these cases in Lemann, How Practitioners Can Use the New
Trust Code, 13 La. B.J. 131, 137 (1965); Oppenheim, A New Trust Code for LouisianaSome Steps Toward Its Achievement, 37 Tul. L. Rev. 169, 171-75 (1963).
148. La. R.S. 9:1723, 1724, 1737 (1965). While making every effort to assure that no
trust could be invalidated because it contained a substitution, the redactors did-as we
have shown-impose certain requirements consistent with the prior law on prohibited
substitutions: beneficiaries must be identified; their interests must be fixed at the creation
of the trust; and, subject to certain exceptions, a principal beneficiary's interest must pass
to his heirs or legatees at his death. Thus, it is not clear that any traditional substitutions
are actually permitted under the Trust Code.
149. Probably the case signifying the turning point in non-trust substitution cases is
Succession of Goode, 395 So. 2d 875 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 425 So. 2d 673
(1983).
150. La. R.S. 9:1753 (1965).
151. La. R.S. 9:2251 (1965).
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tution could invalidate the trust, but total invalidity is not required in
every case.
If a trust does not properly designate a beneficiary at the creation
of the trust, the trust must fail for want of a beneficiary.1 2 On the
other hand, if a beneficiary is properly designated upon the creation of
the trust, the trust should normally be given effect. If the trust document
provides for an improper substitution upon the death of the first designated principal beneficiary, the issue should be whether the substitution
can be stricken from the instrument "without defeating the purpose of
the trust," as provided in Trust Code article 2251.
A court should strike an invalid shift at death and uphold the trust
if the first-named principal beneficiary is clearly the primary object of
the settlor's concern. This approach is especially appropriate if the trust
is designed to terminate when the principal beneficiary reaches a designated age, so that the shift can occur only if the beneficiary fails to
reach that age. Striking the shift and upholding the disposition would
not do violence to the testator's obvious intention to provide primarily
for the designated principal beneficiary.
The way courts have actually analyzed dubious trust agreements has
been somewhat different than the approach just suggested, but the end
results-after an initial disappointing decision-have been in favor of
the validity of questionable trusts, as the redactors had hoped.
The first case decided under the Trust Code by the Louisiana Supreme Court was Chrichton v. Succession of Gredler.5 3 In Chrichton,
the court had to determine the validity of a testamentary trust established
for the settlor's two nephews. The trust was to terminate at the nephews'
deaths, and the property was pass to their children then living, or if
none, to other relatives identified at that time. Stipulations for successor
beneficiaries to take upon the deaths of the first named beneficiaries
were not authorized by the Trust Code. The court held that as a result
the trust was entirely invalid because it contained a substitution, and
that the substitution was not "in trust" because it occurred upon the
termination of the trust. This analysis is faulty. The shifting of interests
occurred as part of the trust arrangement; therefore, it was a substitution
in trust. A proper rationale for the court's decision would have been
that the trust failed either because no trust principal beneficiary was
properly designated at the creation of the trust, 5 4 or because the invalid
shift from the original principal beneficiaries at their deaths could not
be excised from the trust instrument without defeating its purpose.

152. La. R.S. 9:1802, comment (c) (1965).
153. 235 So. 2d 411, 256 La. 156 (1970). For critiques of the decision see Note,
Prohibited Substitutions v. The Louisiana Trust Code, 31 La. L. Rev. 404 (1971); Oppenheim, supra note 81, at 322.
154. La. R.S. 9:1803 (1965).
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But even if the provisions as to principal were invalid, should the
trust have failed completely? While the trust instrument was not clear
on this point, it implied that the nephews would receive all the income
of the trust during their lives. Had the trust been construed that waythe court never reached this question-the interests in income would
have been properly established under the Trust Code regardless of the
invalidity of the designation of principal beneficiaries. Arguably, then,
the trust document should have been enforced as to the nephews' right
to income, so that the trust would last for their lives and the principal
would pass to the testator's intestate heirs upon their deaths. This analysis
is supported by the redactors' comment (c) to article 1802 of the Trust
Code:
If the trust instrument does not designate a beneficiary, the
trust fails. If either a beneficiary of income or principal is
designated, the trust does not fail.
In Chrichton, the court seemed to do what prior courts had often
done-go out of its way to find a prohibited substitution invalidating
an entire trust. The tide turned with Succession of Materiste,5 5 in which
the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the First Circuit was faced with a
testamentary trust for brothers and sisters providing that upon termination of the trust the principal passed to the descendants of the brothers
and sisters, but the share of those that did not leave descendants would
pass to the descendants of the other brothers and sisters. The testator
may have intended to create an invalid substitution of beneficiaries after
the creation of the trust. The trial court decided that because the trust
provisions could be interpreted that way, the trust contained a prohibited
substitution. Nevertheless, ambiguity in the document allowed the court
of appeal to determine that the testator only intended to make vulgar
substitutions. Thus, all interests in trust principal were vested and heritable at the creation of the trust. The court of appeal emphasized that
"the law requires that a prohibited substitution must not be found unless
the only plausible understanding of the provision in question leads
1 6
necessarily to that conclusion."' 1
After Materiste, the Louisiana courts have not returned to the negative attitudes of Chrichton and before. In Succession of Stewart,"57 the
supreme court analyzed a will using the same validity-favoring rules of
construction that the first circuit used in Materiste. Stewart involved
the interpretation of a will of a person who died in 1956, prior to the
1962 and 1964 legislative and constitutional changes. Because it was

155. 273 So. 2d 617 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
156. Id. at 621.
157. 301 So. 2d 872 (La. 1974); discussed in LeVan, Trusts, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1973-74 Term, 35 La. L. Rev. 333 (1975).
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ambiguously drafted, the court could not easily determine who the
intended beneficiaries were. The court interpreted the will as properly
fixing the beneficiaries at the creation of the trust.
The courts in Stewart and other cases" 8 have made it clear that the
Trust Code does not require that the beneficiaries of a trust be specifically
identified as "the income beneficiary" and "the principal beneficiary"
so long as the intention to designate them as such can be found.
Furthermore, one court, 5 9 in order to validate a trust, found that when
the settlor did designate himself as the principal beneficiary, he actually
intended his nieces and nephews, who took after his death, to be the
principal beneficiaries.
In Succession of Burgess,1
'6 a will established a trust for grandchildren living at decedent's death, and provided that if a grandchild
died intestate and without descendants his interest vested in the other
grandchildren or their descendants. The trust did not qualify as a class
trust, and at the time of the settlor's death in 1971 such a shift was
not permitted in non-class trusts. Thus, the provision for the shift was
invalid. The court decided that the invalid shift did not amount to a
"substitution" that would invalidate the entire trust because the shift
would occur only when the beneficiary failed to exercise his testamentary
power. In contrast, a substitution prevents the instituted legatee from
disposing of his property by will. As a result, only the shift was stricken
as illegal and the underlying trust was upheld.
Thus, although sometimes inappropriately using "substitution" terminology, the courts have in recent years applied the provisions of the
Trust Code concerning interpretation of trust instruments in the liberal
way that its redactors apparently intended.
CONCLUSION

The twenty-five years since the adoption of the Trust Code have
seen a greatly increased use of trusts in Louisiana, increased receptivity
in the legislature to making the benefits of the American trust available
in Louisiana, and an increasingly receptive attitude in the judiciary. The
next twenty-five years will no doubt see a continuation of these trends.

158. See, e.g., Succession of Tatum, 347 So. 2d 79 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused,
350 So. 2d 896 (1977).
159. Succession of Tufts, 491 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 497 So.
2d 308 (1986).
160. 359 So. 2d 1006 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 360 So. 2d 1178 (1978).

